Books by George H. Cassar

This text examines Italy's contribution to the Allied effort, and Lloyd George's plan for victory by an offensive on this front. Although his scheme was frustrated, the British troops were committed to holding the Italian line. This account covers the strategic considerations and the fighting.

Lloyd George at War, 19161918 provides a much needed re-evaluation of this charismatic prime ministers wartime leadership. Calling on a wide range of primary sources and focussing on Lloyd Georges role in the war cabinet, Cassar compellingly argues that Georges reputation as the man who won the war was wholly unmerited. Instead Cassar shows that Lloyd Georges heavy handed leadership was often detrimental to the Allied cause. From his wholehearted support for the disastrous Nivelle offensive, to his pursuit of a peripheral strategy that diverted troops away from the critical theatre of war on the Western Front, Cassar shows that Lloyd George consistently bucked the advice of his generals in preference for ineffectual and dangerous military strategies. Cassars approach also differs from that of other studies of Lloyd George by adopting a thematic approach in preference to a chronological narrative, thereby allowing a closer evaluation of Lloyd Georges handling of complex issues.