Books in the African Philosophy: Critical Perspectives and Global Dialogue series

This book critically explores the depths of Nkrumah's philosophical thought in order to broaden understanding of it and measures his contributions to contemporary thought in a world in which Africa totters precariously on the peripheries of intellectual influence on human experience.

In The Rule of Law and Governance in Indigenous Yoruba Society, John Ayotunde Isola Bewaji has two main goals. The first is to provide an exploration of aspects of indigenous Yoruba philosophy of law. The second is to relate this philosophy of law to the Yoruba indigenous traditions of governance, with a view to appreciating the relevance of the Yoruba traditions of law and governance to contemporary African experiments with imported Western democracy in the 21st century. This book is devoted to what can be described as a juridical forensic investigation of Nigeria's predicament of developmental deficit, leading to gross and unconscionable impoverishment of large segments of the population, in the midst of so much natural resources and abundant human capital, using Yoruba indigenous legal traditions as reflective template. Bewaji urges that Africa has to take seriously the necessity of obedience, observance, enforcement and operation of law as no respecter of persons, groups, affiliations and pedigrees as was in the case in the societies founded by our ancestors, rather than the present scenario whereby the highest bidder procures semblances of justice from a crooked system of common law which was never designed to be fair, equitable and just to the disadvantaged in society.

This book critically explores the depths of Nkrumah's philosophical thought in order to broaden understanding of it and measures his contributions to contemporary thought in a world in which Africa totters precariously on the peripheries of intellectual influence on human experience.

Many have argued that ubuntu was a formative influence on the post-apartheid Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), South Africa's famous transitional justice mechanism. A Discourse on African Philosophy: A New Perspective on Ubuntu and Transitional Justice in South Africa challenges and contextualizes this view in a way that not only provides new findings and reflections on ubuntu and the TRC, but also contributes to the field of African philosophy. One of Christian B. N. Gade's key findings, founded on qualitative interviews in South Africa, is that some former TRC commissioners and committee members question the importance of ubuntu in the TRC process. Another is that there are several differing and historically developing interpretations of ubuntu, some of which have evident political implications and reflect non-factual and creative uses of history. Thus ubuntu is not a shared cultural heritage, in the ethnophilosophical sense of a static property characterizing a group. In fact, throughout this book Gade argues that the ethnophilosophical approach to African philosophy as a static group property is highly problematic. Gade's research presents an alternative collective discourse on African philosophy (';collective' in the sense that it does not focus on any single individual in particular) that takes differences, historical developments, and social contexts seriously.This book will be of interest to scholars in African philosophy, transitional justice, politics and cultural heritage, and law in South Africa.

Taking up Jacques Derrida as a figure of thought in relation to Africa, this edited collection poses the questions: What is Derrida to Africa? And, its corollary, what is Africa to Derrida?

This volume probes the interdisciplinary relationships between African literature and African philosophy within the context of epistemological decolonization and the (South) African scholarly transformation project. The contributors map out how philosophy and literature can be viewed as mutually enriching disciplines within and for Africa.

This book examines issues relating to Menkiti's "Person and Community in African Traditional Thought," which articulates an African notion of personhood. Contributors not only show that personhood is normative but also explore the implications this notion of personhood and citizenship holds for the nation-state in Africa.

The book describes a new form of communitarian politics on the African continent, that is able to take seriously both individual entitlements and communitarian obligations. This is achieved by proposing a thin version of communitarianism that realizes the organic relationship between individuals and the community.

This book philosophically explores and works to resolve the tension between equality (impartiality) and favoritism (partiality) in light of intellectual resources in the African tradition of philosophy.

This volume probes the interdisciplinary relationships between African literature and African philosophy within the context of epistemological decolonization and the (South) African scholarly transformation project. The contributors map out how philosophy and literature can be viewed as mutually enriching disciplines within and for Africa.

In Menkiti's Moral Man, Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe offers an original interpretation of Ifeanyi Menkiti's conception of person, one that has significant implications for his metaphysics and moral philosophy. Menkiti holds that one is not born a person but becomes a person in a linguistic and cultural community, denies that the mere possession of intrinsic properties makes one a person, and maintains that personhood is defined by the community. This last process consists in the community socially recognizing as person one who has been incorporated into society and has successfully carried out a range of obligations linked to social roles and positions. On the one hand, Oyowe clarifies the role of intrinsic properties in Menkitis account by arguing that for Menkiti, moral agency and personhood do not coincide. One is a moral agent but not a person in virtue of being rational, free, and endowed with a moral personality. On the other hand, he clarifies the sense in which the community makes one a person by drawing on principles of social ontology to explain how by adopting certain attitudes and practices a community constitutes its members as persons.This interpretation has the potential to illuminate a range of problems raised in response to Menkiti's conception of person.