Books in the Cambridge Military Histories series

For almost 90 years, the battle of Verdun has been synonymous with senseless slaughter. By examining the development of German military ideas from the Franco-German War in 1871 to the First World War, this book offers an unprecedented understanding of one of the bloodiest battles of the twentieth century.

Imperial Germany's invasion of France in August 1914 represented a threat to the great power status of both Britain and France. This book tells the story from both British and French perspectives of how the two countries managed to create a winning coalition relationship.

By 1944, the overwhelming majority of the German Army had participated in the German war of annihilation in the Soviet Union and historians continue to debate the motivations behind the violence unleashed in the east. Jeff Rutherford offers an important new contribution to this debate through a study of combat and the occupation policies of three frontline infantry divisions. He shows that while Nazi racial ideology provided a legitimizing context in which violence was not only accepted but encouraged, it was the Wehrmacht's adherence to a doctrine of military necessity which is critical in explaining why German soldiers fought as they did. This meant that the German Army would do whatever was necessary to emerge victorious on the battlefield. Periods of brutality were intermixed with conciliation as the army's view and treatment of the civilian population evolved based on its appreciation of the larger context of war in the east.

The Indian army fought on the western front with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) from 1914 to 1918. The traditional interpretations of its performance have been dominated by ideas that it was a failure. This book offers a radical reconsideration by revealing new answers to the debate's central questions, such as whether the Indian army 'saved' the BEF from defeat in 1914, or whether Indian troops were particularly prone to self-inflicting wounds and fleeing the trenches. It looks at the Indian army from top to bottom, from generals at headquarters to snipers in no man's land. It takes a global approach, exploring the links between the Indian army's 1914-18 campaigning in France and Belgium and its pre-1914 small wars in Asia and Africa, and comparing the performance of the Indian regiments on the western front to those in China, East Africa, Mesopotamia and elsewhere.

Haig's Intelligence is an important study of Douglas Haig's controversial command during the First World War. Based on extensive new research, it addresses a perennial question about the British army on the Western Front between 1916 and 1918: why did they think they were winning? Jim Beach reveals how the British perceived the German army through a study of the development of the British intelligence system, its personnel and the ways in which intelligence was gathered. He also examines how intelligence shaped strategy and operations by exploring the influence of intelligence in creating perceptions of the enemy. He shows for the first time exactly what the British knew about their opponent, when and how and, in so doing, sheds significant new light on continuing controversies about the British army's conduct of operations in France and Belgium and the relationship between Haig and his chief intelligence officer, John Charteris.

Giulio Douhet is generally considered the world's most important air-power theorist and this book offers the first comprehensive account of his air-power concepts. It ranges from 1884 when an air service was first implemented within the Italian military to the outbreak of the Second World War, and explores the evolution and dissemination of Douhet's ideas in an international context. It examines the impact of the Libyan war, the First World War and Ethiopian war on the development of Italian air-power strategy. It also addresses the issue of Douhet's advocacy of strategic bombing, exploring why it was that Douhet became an advocate of city bombing; the meaning and the limits of his core concept of 'command of the air'; and the mutual impact of air power, military and naval thought. It also takes into account alternatives to Douhetism such as the theories developed by Amedeo Mecozzi and others.

This is a major new account of the Battle of Jutland, the key naval battle of the First World War in which the British Grand Fleet engaged the German High Seas Fleet off the coast of Denmark in 1916. Beginning with the building of the two fleets, John Brooks reveals the key technologies employed, from ammunition, gunnery and fire control, to signalling and torpedoes, as well as the opposing commanders' tactical expectations and battle orders. In describing Jutland's five major phases, he offers important new interpretations of the battle itself and how the outcome was influenced by technology, as well as the tactics and leadership of the principal commanders, with the reliability of their own accounts of the fighting reassessed. The book draws on contemporary sources which have rarely been cited in previous accounts, including the despatches of both the British and German formations, along with official records, letters and memoirs.

Charles Repington was Britain's most influential military correspondent during the first two decades of the twentieth century. From 1914 to 1918, Repington's commentary in The Times, 'The War Day by Day', was read and discussed by opinion-shapers and decision-makers worldwide who sought to better understand the momentous events happening around them, and his subsequently published diaries offered a compelling portrait of England's governing class at war. This is the first major study of Repington's life and career from the Boer War to the end of the Great War. A. J. A. Morris presents unique insights into the conduct of the First World War and into leading figures in the British high command: French, Haig, Robertson, Wilson. The book offers modern readers a rewardingly fresh understanding of the conflict, and will appeal to scholars of the First World War and British political and military history of the period.

Military professionals and theorists have long understood the relevance of morale in war. Montgomery, the victor at El Alamein, said, following the battle, that 'the more fighting I see, the more I am convinced that the big thing in war is morale'. Jonathan Fennell, in examining the North African campaign through the lens of morale, challenges conventional explanations for Allied success in one of the most important and controversial campaigns in British and Commonwealth history. He introduces new sources, notably censorship summaries of soldiers' mail, and an innovative methodology that assesses troop morale not only on the evidence of personal observations and official reports but also on contemporaneously recorded rates of psychological breakdown, sickness, desertion and surrender. He shows for the first time that a major morale crisis and stunning recovery decisively affected Eighth Army's performance during the critical battles on the Gazala and El Alamein lines in 1942.

This book tells the story of the invasion of France at the twilight of Napoleon's empire. With more than a million men under arms throughout central Europe, Coalition forces poured over the Rhine River to invade France between late November 1813 and early January 1814. Three principal army groups drove across the great German landmark, smashing the exhausted French forces that attempted to defend the eastern frontier. In less than a month, French forces ingloriously retreated from the Rhine to the Marne; Allied forces were within one week of reaching Paris. This book provides the first complete English-language study of the invasion of France along a front that extended from Holland to Switzerland.

Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of the Soviet Union, began the largest and most costly campaign in military history. Its failure was a key turning point of the Second World War. The operation was planned as a Blitzkrieg to win Germany its Lebensraum in the east, and the summer of 1941 is well-known for the German army's unprecedented victories and advances. Yet the German Blitzkrieg depended almost entirely upon the motorised Panzer groups, particularly those of Army Group Centre. Using archival records, in this book David Stahel presents a history of Germany's summer campaign from the perspective of the two largest and most powerful Panzer groups on the Eastern front. Stahel's research provides a fundamental reassessment of Germany's war against the Soviet Union, highlighting the prodigious internal problems of the vital Panzer forces and revealing that their demise in the earliest phase of the war undermined the whole German invasion.

This is a major reassessment of the role of the war at sea in Allied victory in the Mediterranean. Richard Hammond demonstrates how the anti-shipping campaign was the fulcrum about which strategy in the theatre pivoted, and the vital enabling factor ultimately leading to Allied victory in the region.

This book challenges the view that World War II was decided by land battles. It argues that victory was due to the production and allocation of American and British air and sea weaponry that was used to destroy over half of the Axis's equipment before it reached the traditional 'battlefield'.

Allied political and military leadership had been planning for, and expecting, the First World War to continue into 1919. In this exploration of Allied war plans for 1918-1919, Meighen McCrae uncovers how the Supreme War Council became a successful mechanism for coalition war.

This is the story of the highest battlefield of World War Two, which brings to life the extremes of mountain warfare. The Caucasus Mountains became the battleground between elite German mountain divisions and the untrained soldiers of the Red Army, as they fought each other, the weather and the terrain.

This is an important new history of decision- and policy-making in the British Admiralty from Trafalgar to the aftermath of Jutland. The author explores the role of technological change, the global balance of power, and finance and the First World War, in shaping decision-making and organisational development within the Admiralty.

The first authoritative study of the Italian armed forces and the relationship between the military and foreign policies of Fascist Italy from 1922 to 1940. John Gooch shows that Mussolini's generals and admirals bore a share of the blame for defeat through policies that all too often rested on incompetence.

The first comprehensive English-language history of the Axis campaign in North Africa offers an account of the battles of 1941-3, Rommel's generalship, the divisions that undermined the Axis coalition and the place of the campaign within the broader strategic context of the war.