Books in the Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science series

Understanding is a central aim of science and highly important in present-day society. But what precisely is scientific understanding and how can it be achieved? This book answers these questions, through philosophical analysis and historical case studies, and presents a philosophical theory of scientific understanding that highlights its contextual nature.

Not all scientific explanations work by describing causal connections between events or the world's overall causal structure. In addition, mathematicians regard some proofs as explaining why the theorems being proved do in fact hold. This book proposes new philosophical accounts of many kinds of non-causal explanations in science and mathematics.

Though science and philosophy take different approaches to ontology, metaphysical inferences are relevant to interpreting scientific work, and empirical investigations are relevant to philosophy. This book argues that there is no uniquely rational way to determine which domains of ontology are appropriate for belief, making room for choice in a transformative account of scientific ontology.

In Systematicity, Paul Hoyningen-Huene answers the question "What is science?" by proposing that scientific knowledge is primarily distinguished from other forms of knowledge, especially from everyday knowledge, by being more systematic.

In The Ant Trap, Brian Epstein rewrites our understanding of the nature of the social world and the foundations of the social sciences. He develops a new model of the social world, and shows that the actions and intentions of social groups often depend on more than their members.

Universally recognized as bringing about a transformation of the notions of space, time, and motion in physics, Einstein's theory of gravitation, known as "general relativity," was also a defining event for 20th century philosophy of science. This book looks at the argument that the path actually taken contributed to the impasse over realism.

Batterman examines a form of scientific reasoning called asymptotic reasoning, which he argues has important consequences for our understanding of the scientific process as a whole. He simplifies some of the more complex questions about universal behaviour, demonstrating a an understanding of the underlying structures that ground them.

Takes a historical and philosophical approach to examine how scientists were able to use scientific methods to test the reliability of thermometers; how they measured temperature beyond the reach of thermometers; and how they came to measure the reliability and accuracy of these instruments without a circular reliance on the instruments.

Philosophy of science studies the methods, theories and concepts used by scientists. This book addresses both general philosophy of science and specific questions raised by logic, mathematics, physics, biology, medicine, cognitive science, linguistics, social sciences, and economics.

The book examines issues related to the way modeling and simulation enable us to reconstruct aspects of the world we are investigating. It also investigates the processes by which we extract concrete knowledge from those reconstructions and how that knowledge is legitimated.

Mathematics plays a central role in much of contemporary science, but philosophers have struggled to understand what this role is or how significant it might be for mathematics and science. Pincock tackles this perennial question by asking how mathematics contributes to the success of our best scientific representations.

This book is the first comprehensive attempt to solve what Hartry Field has called "the central problem in the metaphysics of causation": the problem of reconciling the need for causal notions in the special sciences with the limited role of causation in physics.

Designed to show that classical physics, while successful in describing phenomena, has interesting conceptual problems worth discussing. This book also views that electrodynamics leaves out some aspects of scientific theorizing, namely that the notion that consistency is over-valued, and that an inconsistent theory can still be successful.

Constructs a comprehensive account of causation explanation that applies to a variety of causal and explanatory claims in different areas of science and everyday life. This book weaves together examples, counterexamples, criticisms, defences, and objections.

Da Costa and French explore the consequences of adopting a 'pragmatic' notion of truth in the philosophy of science. Their framework sheds new light on issues to do with belief, theory acceptance, and the realism-antirealism debate, as well as the nature of scientific models and their heuristic development.

Achinstein explores the question of how something comes to be considered as evidence for a theory, claims that most current theories are too weak to give scientists a good reason to believe in the value of evidence, and ultimately develops his own theory of evidence.

Closely examining some of our notions about the role of science, the author engages the heated debate about how scientific knowledge should be pursued and employed. He paints a portrait of the sciences that allows for the possibility of scientific truth but nonetheless permits social consensus to determine which avenues need to be investigated.