Join thousands of book lovers
Sign up to our newsletter and receive discounts and inspiration for your next reading experience.
By signing up, you agree to our Privacy Policy.You can, at any time, unsubscribe from our newsletters.
Unless considered on a practical level, where a precise distribution of social goods is chosen, John Rawls's and Gerald Cohen's approaches to social justice cannot be complementary. Their disagreement about justice and its principles calls for a choice, which opts either for the Rawlsian theory or for the Cohenian one. What is the more plausible approach to social justice? This work compares both approaches and aims to defend Cohen's position in the light of two considerations. It answers the philosophical question about the analysis of the idea of justice, which puts the virtue of justice in its philosophical context. It, however, presents a method everyone can apply in order to arrive at the fundamental principles of justice by employing the power of reason. An analysis of the concept of justice based on the power of reason should seek to uncover the ultimate nature of justice, which is independent of facts and of other virtues. Once exposed, the understanding of justice arrived at should inform social institutions and determine people's daily decisions. A just society is therefore a society where just persons and just institutions exhibit the virtue of justice.
The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.
The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.
The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.
The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.
The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.
The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.
The aim of the series is to publish high-quality studies in English or German that deal with topics in practical philosophy from a broadly analytic perspective. These include questions in meta-ethics, normative ethics and 'applied' ethics, as well as in political philosophy, philosophy of law and the philosophy of action.
Contains original essays from both sides of the debate. Representing a range of metaethical views, this title helps you develop diverse accounts of normativity and discuss what it means for a concept to be natural.
Explaining Altruism: A Simulation-Based Approach and its Limits
This book presents an answer to the question of why modern legal institutions and the idea of citizenship are important for leading a free life. The majority of views in political and legal philosophy regard the law merely as a useful instrument, employed to render our lives more secure and to enable us to engage in cooperate activities more efficiently. The view developed here defends a non-instrumentalist alternative of why the law matters. It identifies the law as a constitutive feature of our identities as citizens of modern states. The constitutivist argument rests on the (Kantian) assumption that a person's practical identity (its normative self-conception as an agent) is the result of its actions. The law co-constitutes these identities because it maintains the external conditions that are necessary for the actions performed under its authority. Modern legal institutions provide these external prerequisites for achieving a high degree of individual self-constitution and freedom. Only public principles can establish our status as individuals who pursue their life plans and actions as a matter of right and not because others contingently happen to let us do so. The book thereby provides resources for a reply to anarchist challenges to the necessity of legal ordering.
Sign up to our newsletter and receive discounts and inspiration for your next reading experience.
By signing up, you agree to our Privacy Policy.