Books in the Swansea Studies in Philosophy series

This book shows how our moral concepts are nourished by awe, reverence and various forms of love. In ways moral philosophy commonly misses, this book shows moral understanding is broadened and deepened by what is disclosed only in these forms of encounter.

Wittgenstein's Copernican Revolution is concerned with how one is to conceive of the relation between language and reality without embracing Linguistic Realism and without courting any form of Linguistic Idealism either.

This collection of essays explores the area of ethics in relation to issues such as the nature of moral endeavour and the request for a justification of moral endeavour. Professor Phillips considers the work of Thomas Nagel and Peter Winch in this book.

Original essays by distinguished philosophers from different fields of philosophy are brought together in this book. Reflections on moral discourse and its contexts are provided and the authors discuss the nature and tasks of moral philosophy. The overall collection creates a dialogue between different philosophical views.

A collection of essays which explores the significance of Wittgenstein for the Philosophy of Religion. Explorations of central notions in Wittgenstein's later philosophy are brought to bear on the clash between belief and atheism; understanding religious experience; language and ritual; and the possibility of a Christian philosophy.

Rush Rhees questions the viability of moral theories and the general claims they make in ethics. To recognise why philosophy cannot answer such questions for us is an affirmation, not a denial, of their importance.

It is widely held in contemporary moral philosophy that moral agency must be explained in terms of some more basic account of human nature.

In this book the author argues that human musical understanding is rooted in the traditions of culture and that experience of music depends crucially on what the individual brings to it.

Rush Rhees questions the viability of moral theories and the general claims they make in ethics. To recognise why philosophy cannot answer such questions for us is an affirmation, not a denial, of their importance.