Books published by Books Express Publishing

United States Army Center of Military History publication, CMH Pub 70-113-1. United States Army in Iraq and Afghanistan Series. Edited by Jon T. Hoffman. Provides a soldier's-eye view of the Iraq war.

Reviews of this study on leadership include: "Beau Puryear has written a brilliant and insightful account of Marine Corps generalship. He has truly captured the essence of what the Corps values in its senior leaders. It is a humbling honor to be included in this superb work. This is a must-read for all those who want to understand Marine Corps leadership and why it is so respected." - General (Ret.) Anthony C. Zinni, USMC (Ret.). "This book is the best treatise on leadership, and all the characteristics that make it up, that I've ever read. It will be a bestseller in the Marine Corps, and beyond that-and will create in our sister Service members who read it an even greater envy that they didn't choose the Marine Corps. By drawing directly from the experiences of those who have led, Beau Puryear has offered the reader page after page of "how tos." I wish I had had access to this book when I was 25 years old. Whatever else I did in my years in the Corps would have been a quantum leap greater because of the lessons culled from leaders a hell of a lot more effective than me." - General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., USMC (Ret.).

NASA SP 2007-4410. NASA History Series. Recounts the story of the rise of Space Exploration Initiative (SEI) and its eventual demise. Tells of organizational, cultural, and personal confrontation. Organizational skirmishes involved the Space Council versus NASA, the White House versus congressional appropriators, and the Johnson Space Center versus the rest of the space agency--all seeking control of the national space policy process.

Taking advantage of the Soviet archives, which were opened in the 1990s, Siddiqi has written a groundbreaking work that examines why the Soviet Union fell behind in the space race of the 1960s after changing the course of human history with the first artificial satellite launch, Sputnik, in 1957. 1,030 pp.

Originally published in 1964, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

Originally published in 1968, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

Originally published in 1971, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

Originally published in 1970, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

Originally published in 1972, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

Originally published in 1971, this is a volume in the "Smithsonian Annals of Flight" series.

Originally published in 1989, this a volume from the Combat Studies Institute "Leavenworth Papers" series. In the fall of 1944, some 56,000 German troops of the XIX Mountain Corps were occupying a strongpoint line just 70 kilometers northwest of Murmansk, about 200 miles north of the Arctic Circle. To clear these enemy forces from Soviet territory, STA VKA ordered General K. A. Meretskov's Karelian Front to plan and conduct an offensive, which was to be supported by Admiral A. G. Golovko's Northern Fleet. This Leavenworth Paper explains the planning and conduct of this offensive, known in Soviet military historiography as the Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation. The Soviet force of approximately 96,000 men was organized into a main attack force of two rifle corps, a corps- size economy-of-force formation, and two envelopment forces, one consisting of two naval infantry brigades and the other of two light rifle corps of two brigades each. The Soviets employed over 2,100 tubes of artillery and mortars, used 110 tanks and self-propelled guns, and enjoyed overwhelming air superiority. Engineer special-purpose troops infiltrated up to fifty kilometers behind German forward positions to conduct reconnaissance before the battle. On 7 October 1944, the Soviets began the offensive with a 97,000-round artillery preparation, followed by an infantry attack.

Originally published in 1982, this a volume in the Combat Studies Institute "Leavenworth Papers" series. Abstract: "Night combat has frequently been the recourse of the inferior military force or, as in World War II, of the army seeking either to find some respite from air power or to reduce casualties in the face of great firepower. Still, despite the difficulties associated with conducting military operations at night, military planners and leaders cannot escape one salient fact: darkness is a double-edged weapon. During World War II, the Soviets effectively exploited darkness in a variety of operations from withdrawal to pursuit. As the war dragged on, the Red Army relied increasingly on night operations and so refined its abilities that it was able to progress from limited tactical missions by relatively small units to front-level operations by armies with complex coordination and control. Today Soviet military writers frequently discuss night operations, as they do all operations, with reference to their experiences in the Second World War. They appear convinced, as one Soviet general and historian has noted, that their troops should be equally capable of operating both during the day and at night and that night operations have an urgent significance in modern warfare". Include photos. maps, tables.

Originally published in 1984, this a volume in the Combat Studies Institute "Leavenworth Papers" series. On the night of 10-11 July, several thousand Japanese infantrymen attack and broke through U.S. Army covering force units defending the Driniumor River about twenty miles east of Aitape, New Guinea. For the next month U.S. army troops were locked in a battle of attrition with the Japanese, as the Americans fought to restore the breakthrough line and destroy the Japanese attackers. This study describes the events leading up to the Japanese breakthrough and the subsequent American counterattack to restore the original defensive positions. Include photos. maps, tables.

Originally published in 1981. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by Brig. Gen Soutchay Vongsavanh, then Commanding General of Military Region 4. The study reviews and analyzes Royal Lao Government military operations in the Laotion panhandle. Special attention is devoted to the significance of the panhandle for enemy military operations in South Vietnam and Cambodia, the initiation of conventional warfare in southern Laos, lessons learned during the employment of regular and irregular forces and developments following the 1973 cease-fire.

Originally published in 1979. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung.

Originally published in 1981. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung.

Originally published in 1980. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by General Cao Van Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff.

Originally published in 1980. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina.

Originally published in 1979. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina.

Originally published in 1979. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by Lt. Gen . Sak Sutsakhan.

Originally published in 1979. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina.

Originally published in 1980. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina. This volume was written by Lt. Gen Dong Van Khuyen.

Originally published in 1980. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina.

Originally published in 1980. This is a volume in the hard-to-find "Indochina Monographs" series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Volumes in the series were written by officers who held responsible positions in the Cambodia, Laotian and South Vietnamese armed forces during the war in Indochina.

First published in 1993. This study focuses on the conduct of the battle and the role of American combat advisers and United States air power played in defeating the North Vietnamese forces during the Spring of 1972.

Firs published in 1991. "Desert Warfare: German Experiences in World War II" is an abridgment of a two-volume work that first appeared in 1952. Organized by Major General Alfred Toppe and written with the assistance of nine German commanders who served in North Africa, the manuscript represents a collaborative attempt to determine as many factors as possible which exerted a determining influence on desert warfare. Issues addressed include planning, intelligence, logistics, and operations. Described and analyzed are the German order of battle, the major military engagements in North Africa, and the particular problems of terrain and climate in desert operations. Not unlike many of the U.S. units engaged in the war with Iraq, the Germans in North Africa learned about combat operations in the desert only after they arrived on the scene and confronted the desert on its own terms. For this reason alone, as well as for the insights it offers, Desert Warfare requires the serious consideration of those responsible for preparing the U.S. military for any future conflict in desert terrain.

First published in 1988. Over sixty years have passed since Allied armies landed in Normandy with the purpose of liberating western Europe and destroying Hitler's Third Reich. Despite this passage of time and extensive writings on the landings in France, officers and historians are still intensely interested in D-Day and the Normandy campaign. Indeed, a great deal remains to be learned about the U.S. Armys's participation in the Normandy campaign, and a detailed examination of the fighting yields a fruitful case study for America's professional officer corps concerning how American soldiers performed in combat, how squads and platoons closed with and destroyed the enemy, and how the Army adapted methods to overcome a whole host of problems that it encountered in combat. This study attempts to identify the problems that hampered the operations of the U.S. First Army during the weeks immediately following the D-Day landings. in Normandy, inexperienced American combat units struggled with veteran German defenders on terrain specially suited for the defense. The U.S. Army was faced with the problem of conducting offensive operations in the Normandy hedgerow country- known as the Bocage. Shortcomings in preinvasion training and preparation resulted initially in uncoordinated efforts whenever American infantry, tanks, and artillery tried to combine forces during attacks.