Books published by University Press of the Pacific

A comprehensive history of French literature from the Middle Ages through to the naturalism of the late 19th century, as represented by the works of Flaubert, Baudelaire and Dumas fils. The essential reference work on French literature, its periodization, chief writers, and themes.This title is cited and recommended by the Catalogue of the Lamont Library, Harvard College.

Prout's still indispensable work is profusely illustrated with musical examples woven directly into the text. Strict Counterpoint is the preliminary technical work for actual musical composition.At the time of original publication, Ebenezer Prout was Professor of Harmony and Composition at the Royal Academy of Music.

Highly publicized accounts of abuse in military weapons procurement have raised both citizen awareness of and citizen concern with the properly monitored spending of US defense dollars. Not long ago, media reports of spare parts overpricing and related problems ignited harsh public criticism of the handling of the multibillion dollar defense contracts for the F100 jet engine. According to Colonel Robert Drewes, US Air Force, though, the outcome of the subsequent "Great Engine War" calls not for criticism, but for praise for the Department of Defense. Long before the public became aware of the controversy, the Air Force was grappling with the problems of the F100 high performance engine and the contract for its procurement and maintenance. As difficulties mounted in negotiations with the sole-source supplier, the Air Force, Navy, and Congress held their ground and eventually prevailed. The account of their combined efforts is an encouraging story about the Department of Defense and the US Government "setting things right," a story that has not been fully told before. The case is not closed on jet engine contracting, or any other kind of defense contracting, but the Great Engine War is welcome reassurance that US defense dollars --closely monitored-- will be spent wisely.Bradley C. HosmerLieutenant General, US Air ForcePresident, National Defense University

Learning to Live is the sequel to The Road to Life. "In The Road to Life I dealt with the question of how best to describe man in a community, how to describe man's struggle with himself, and the struggle of the community for its worth and its personality, which are struggles that can be more or less tense. In Learning to Live I had quite another object in view. I wanted to describe that wonderful community in which I had the pleasure of working, to describe its inner movements, its life and its surroundings."Anton Makarenko was to Soviet education what John Dewey was to education in America. Ukrainian Makarenko taught orphans after World War II, and his methods became the model for Stalin-era education."Your enormously important and amazingly successful educational experiment is of world-wide significance." -- Maxim Gorky

A thorough study of the heritage of Frederick and how he built upon it throughout his life as he extended Prussia's power and role in European politics.This title is cited and recommended by Books for College Libraries; the Catalogue of the Lamont Library, Harvard College; and The American Historical Association's Guide to Historical Literature.At the time of original publication in 1904, W. F. Reddaway was Fellow and Lecturer of King's College, Cambridge.

This manual describes the guidelines to be followed in selecting a process capable of producing potable water supplies from brackish and sea water sources. Prepared by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers for military water needs, the technical information is equally applicable to many civilian needs.

On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed a Military Order pertaining to the detention, treatment, and trial of certain non-citizens as part of the war against terrorism. The order makes clear that the President views the crisis that began on the morning of September 11 as an attack "on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United States Armed Forces." The order finds that the effective conduct of military operations and prevention of military attacks make it necessary to detain certain non-citizens and if necessary, to try them "for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals." The unprecedented nature of the September attacks and the magnitude of damage and loss of life they caused have led a number of officials and commentators to assert that the acts are not just criminal acts, they are "acts of war." The President's Military Order makes it apparent that he plans to treat the attacks as acts of war rather than criminal acts. The distinction may have more than rhetorical significance. Treating the attacks as violations of the international law of war could allow the United States to prosecute those responsible as war criminals, trying them by special military commission rather than in federal court. The purpose of this report is to identify some of the legal and practical implications of treating the terrorist acts as war crimes and of applying the law of war rather than criminal statutes to prosecute the alleged perpetrators. The report will first present an outline of the sources and principles of the law of war, including a discussion of whether and how it might apply to the current terrorist crisis. A brief explanation of the background issues and arguments surrounding the use of military commissions will follow. The report will then explore the legal bases and implications of applying the law of war under United States law, summarize precedent for its application by military commissions, and provide an analysis of the President's Military Order of November 13, 2001. Finally, the report discusses considerations for establishing rules of procedure and evidence that comport with international standards.

This book traces the history of the U.S. Army Signal Corps from its beginnings on the eve of the American Civil War through its participation in the Persian Gulf conflict during the early 1990s. Over the course of its 135 years of existence, the Signal Corps has often been at the forefront of the revolutionary changes that have taken place in communications technology. It contributed significantly, for example, to the development of radar and the transistor. In today's information age, the Signal Corps continues its tradition of leadership and innovation on the digitized battlefields of the twenty-first century. While accounts of the branch's service during the Civil War, World War II, and Vietnam have been published, little has been written about the rest of the Signal Corps' accomplishments. This book fills out the picture. It shows today's signal soldiers where their branch has been and points the way to where it is going. The reader, whether military or civilian, can follow the growth and development of one of the Army's most sophisticated technical branches. By telling the Signal Corps' story in a comprehensive manner, this volume makes a significant contribution to the history of the Army.Douglas D. Buchholz John W. MountcastleMajor General, USA Brigadier General, USAChief of Signal Chief of Military History

Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Lewis F. Powell, Jr., was one of a small group of people specially selected to accept and integrate ULTRA, the most secret signals intelligence from intercepted and decoded German military radio transmissions, with intelligence from all other sources. From May 1944 to the end of the war in Europe, he served as the ULTRA officer on General Carl Spaatz's United States Strategic Air Forces staff. Earlier, Colonel Powell had served as an intelligence officer with the 319th Bomb Group, the Twelfth Air Force, and the Northwest African Air Forces. He finished the war as Spaatz's Chief of Operational Intelligence in addition to carrying out his ULTRA duties. The Air Force is grateful to Justice Powell for his generosity in giving his time and recollections so that his experiences can be of benefit, through the medium of history, to the Service today and in the future.

Water is a major limiting factor in most areas where Western arid and semiarid agriculture is currently practiced. Increasing water demands from nonagricultural users plus growing problems of ground water depletion, salt buildup in agricultural soils, and water-quality deterioration are causing heightened concern about the sustainability of Western agriculture. A major part of this concern is focused on whether the Federal agricultural system is prepared to meet the changing needs of Western agriculture and whether technology can assist in providing the Nation with Western agricultural production that is sustainable and profitable over the long term. This report assesses existing and emerging water-related technologies for their ability to support long-term productivity of arid/semiarid agricultural plants and animals in the context of institutional factors, water supply/use relationships, and the characteristics of the renewable natural resource base on which agriculture depends. The study was requested by the House Committee on Agriculture and endorsed by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Water Resources. The technologies examined by the study are generally directed toward: 1) improving efficiency of water use, whether for rain-fed (dryland and rangeland) systems or irrigation; 2) improving water management, storage, and distribution for agriculture; and 3) augmenting existing supplies with additional water not previously available. The report also identifies a number of options for congressional action. A background paper containing examples of application of arid/semiarid agricultural technologies in foreign countries has been published separately as part of this assessment. The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) greatly appreciates the contributions of the advisory panel, working groups and workshop participants assembled for this study, the authors of the technical papers, and the many other advisors and reviewers who assisted us, including farmers, ranchers, agricultural scientists in government and universities, and experts in the private sector. Their guidance and comments helped develop a comprehensive report. As with all OTA studies, however, the content of the report is the sole responsibility of OTA. John H. Gibbons Director

CONTENTS Foreword Preface About the Author Chapter 1. The First Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, Walther Wever Wever's Military Background Chief of the Air Command Office Chapter 2. Field Marshal Erhard Milch, State Secretary of Aviation Milch's Early Career Milch as State Secretary of Aviation Chapter 3. Ernst Udet, Chief of Luftwaffe Supply and Procurement Udet's Early Life and Character Chief of the Technical Office The Deterioration of German Air Armament under Udet Reorganization of Udet's Organization Udet's Death Chapter 4. Reichsmarschall Hermann W. Goering The Impact of Goering's Personality upon the Luftwaffe Goering and Hitler Goering's Waning Interest in Work Commander in Chief During Wartime Goering as Chief Legal Authority of the Luftwaffe Wrong Decisions and the Beginning of the End Goering Advises Against the Russian Campaign The Paladin Loses Hitler's Confidence The Decline of the Luftwaffe The Attempts to Overthrow Goering Goering's Overthrow Chapter 5. Hans Jeschonnek, Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff Jeschonnek's Early Life and Career A Youthful Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff Beau-Ideal of a Soldier, but a Mere Soldier Jeschonnek and Germany's Unready Air Arm Did Jeschonnek Inform Hitler about the Luftwaffe's Strength? Jeschonnek's Planning Staff Baptism of Fire War and Brilliant Successes Signs of Weakness Begin to Appear in the Luftwaffe A Farewell to Blitzes Did the General Staff Demand an Effective Strengthening of the Luftwaffe in 1940? A War of Attrition Sets in for the Luftwaffe The Last Chance for Recovery: A Reorganization of the Luftwaffe Germany's Last Great Hopes and Changes in the Fortunes of War Stalingrad Was Jeschonnek a Party to the Decision to Supply Stalingrad by Air? The Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff and the War in the East The Growing Threat to the Home Front Jeschonnek, Milch, and Goering Jeschonnek Between Hitler and Goering Jeschonnek's Suicide Jeschonnek's Memorandum A Child of His Times Footnotes Appendix List of Charts Charts Dr. Richard Suchenwirth, a well-known and somewhat controversial German and Austrian historian, author, teacher and lecturer, was born in Vienna in 1896. A lieutenant in World War I, he served as an aide to an Austrian general and learned much at firsthand concerning the problems of leadership.

This book gives a unique personal glimpse of modern Chinese history from the beginning of the century to the "Cultural Revolution" through the eyes of one of the builders of the Chinese Red Army. Born into a poor peasant family in Hunan Province, Marshal Peng Dehuai (1898-1974) enlisted in 1916 in one of the old warlords' armies. While rising through the ranks to become a regimental commander, Peng Dehuai worked underground to organize soldiers' rights groups. He joined the Communist Party shortly before leading the Pingjiang Uprising in 1928 against reactionary rule. After founding the Third Army of the Chinese Red Army, Peng Dehuai went on to a brilliant career as an eminent commander before and during the epic Long March, in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation, and in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea. After Liberation in 1949, he senred as Vice-Premier of the State Council and Minister of Defence. Marshal Peng Dehuai fell into political disgrace in 1959 after addressing a letter to Chairman Mao Zedong pointing out some of the problems in the "Great Leap Forward". Under virtual house arrest for most of the last 16 years of his life, Marshal Peng did manual labour and wrote biographical notes in response to demands for "confessions". He died under persecution during the "Cultural Revolution" on November 29, 1974. Exonerated by the CPC Central Committee in 1978, Marshal Peng Dehuai has been restored to his rightful place in history as one of the greatest military leaders in China's revolution.

This volume examines the least known of the major units in the European theater, General Jacob L. Devers' 6th Army Group. Under General Devers' leadership, two armies, the U.S. Seventh Army under General Alexander M. Patch and the First French Army led by General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, landing on the Mediterranean coast near Marseille in August 1944, cleared the enemy out of southern France and then turned east and joined with army groups under Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery and General Omar N. Bradley in the final assault on Germany. In detailing the campaign of these Riviera-based armies, the authors have concentrated on the operational level of war, paying special attention to the problems of joint, combined, and special operations and to the significant roles of logistics, intelligence, and personnel policies in these endeavors. They have also examined in detail deception efforts at the tactical and operational levels, deep battle penetrations, river-crossing efforts, combat in built-up areas, and tactical innovations at the combined arms level. Such concepts are of course very familiar to today's military students, and the fact that this volume examines them in such detail makes this study especially valuable to younger officers and noncommissioned officers. In truth, the challenges faced by military commanders half a century ago were hardly unique. That is why I particularly urge today's military students, who might well face some of these same problems in future combat, to study this campaign so that they might learn from their illustrious predecessors in the profession of arms.

This manual provides criteria and guidance for the design of structures to resist the effects of earthquakes. It takes a general approach for the seismic design of buildings, including architectural components, mechanical and electrical equipment supports, some structures other than buildings, and utility systems. Primary emphasis is given to the equivalent static force design procedure.

This manual was prepared by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and provides technical criteria and guidance for the planning, design, and construction of tunnels and shafts in rock for civil works projects. Specific areas covered include geological and geotechnical explorations required, construction of tunnels and shafts, design considerations, geomechanical analysis, design of linings, and instrumentation and monitoring. The manual emphasizes design, construction and an understanding of the methods, and conditions of construction essential to the preparation of good designs.

A bold, unconventional use of American air power to support British ground troops in Burma, Operation THURSDAY marked a critical development in the history of modern warfare. On March 5-6, 1944, the Allies conducted an air invasion of Burma, in an attempt to push back the Japanese in the China-Burma-India Theater and reestablish the land route between India and China. U.S. airmen formed a special operations unit -the 1st Air Commando Group- to transport troops to jungle locations and resupply them, often in the line of fire. The remarkable success of this operation lives on, fifty years later, among the elite 1st Air Commando Group-a force committed to meeting the challenge of unconventional warfare any time, any place, anywhere.

It is commonplace within and outside the intelligence community to acknowledge the predominant role of technology in the collection, dissemination, and even analysis of information. Whit roots traceable to events in the late 1800s, this technological phenomenon loomed ever larger in the twentieth century. The increasing reliance on photographic, signals, and electronic intelligence has been viewed with varying degrees of celebration and concern by scholars and intelligence professionals. This volume contains the essays and commentaries originally presented at the Thirteenth Military Symposium held to address this topic at the United States Air Force Academy from October 12 to 14, 1998. The Participants in the conference attempted to provide a preliminary evaluation of the transformations that have occurred within the military intelligence community as a consequence of the Second World War. Not only did that conflict accelerate advances in technical means of collection, it also led to an international willingness to share intelligence on an unprecedented scale. The years 1939-1945 therefore witnessed a true "revolution" in intelligence collection and cooperation. That war also caused an interrelated growth in organizational size, efficiency, and sophistication that helped gain the craft of intelligence an acceptance in operational circles that it had not previously enjoyed.

Approximately 23.3 million operations were performed in 1989 in the United States, and most of these involved some form of pain management. Unfortunately, clinical surveys continue to indicate that routine orders for intramuscular injections of opioid "as needed"-the standard practice in many clinical settings-fail to relieve pain in about half of postoperative patients. Postoperative pain contributes to patient discomfort, longer recovery periods, and greater use of scarce health care resources and may compromise patient outcomes. There is wide variation in the methods used to manage postoperative and other acute pain, ranging from no set strategy to a comprehensive team approach as advocated in this clinical practice guideline. This guideline sets forth procedures to minimize the incidence and severity of acute pain after surgical and medical procedures and pain associated with trauma in adults and children. It offers clinicians a coherent yet flexible approach to pain assessment and management for use in daily practice. Although it is not practical or desirable to eliminate all postoperative and other acute pain, an aggressive approach to pain assessment and management can reduce such pain, increase patient comfort and satisfaction, and in some cases, contribute to improved patient outcomes and shorter hospital stays. This clinical practice guideline was developed under the sponsorship of the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR), Public Health Service, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. To develop the guideline, AHCPR convened an interdisciplinary expert panel made up of physicians, nurses, a pharmacist, a psychologist, a physical therapist, a patient/consumer, and an ethicist. The panel first undertook an extensive and interdisciplinary clinical review of current needs, therapeutic practices and principles, and emerging technologies for pain assessment and management. Second, the panel conducted a comprehensive review of the field to define the existing knowledge base and critically evaluate the assumptions and common wisdom in the field. Third, the panel initiated peer review of guideline drafts and field review with intended users in clinical sites. Comments from these reviews were assessed and used in developing the guideline.

The Enlisted Experience: A Conversation with the Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force offers a vivid, candid, and highly personal account of military life by four of the first five Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force. Their recollections, captured in a 1989 interview at Bolling Air Force Base in Washington, D.C., cover a period of over thirty years-from the early 1940s to the late 1970s. The position of Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, held by only ten individuals since its establishment in 1966, has given all enlisted service members a representative with direct access to and the ability to advise the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force. It has also imparted to each of the interviewees broad and insightful perspectives on the issues discussed. Their careers and the experiences that shaped them reveal that throughout its brief but eventful history the U.S. Air Force has been able to rely completely on the competence, dedication, and absolute professionalism of its enlisted force. This force has proved again and again up to the host of challenges that have confronted it at home and around the globe-tirelessly maintaining the aircraft and supporting the air crews in War II, Korea, and Vietnam, integrating the ranks and welcoming women as equals into the workplace, obtaining a better quality of life for themselves and their families, and pursuing increasingly demanding education and training programs in fast-changing social and technological service milieus. The stories of the Chief Master Sergeants of the Air Force point to an essential fact-that the service would be unable to carry out its missions successfully in a dangerous world without the genuine cooperation of a motivated enlisted corps. That the Air Force almost flawlessly achieved its objectives in Operation DESERT STORM is in no small measure the result of that corps' tradition of striving and excellence.Richard P. HallionAir Force Historian

This survey by the Library of Congress collects a broad range of information detailing the enormous costs-in human and material resources-incurred as a result of the war in Indochina. The compilation of this information will, I hope, serve to bring into perspective and to clarify the stark implications of United States policy toward this region. The casualty and refugee figures are sadly familiar from the daily newspapers. However, many of the other items also illustrate the profound effect of the war and may not have received the attention they deserve. For example, it is estimated that chemical herbicides have been applied to nearly one-seventh of South Vietnam (6 pounds per person), thereby destroying enough food for 600,000 people for 1 year and enough timber to meet the needs of the country, based on current demand, for 31 years. In South Vietnam agricultural productivity has been lowered; inflation is rampant (Saigon's retail prices having increased by over 700 percent since 1965); and last year the balance, if it can be called that, of trade showed approximately $600 million of imports versus exports of only $12 million. Nevertheless, although this report documents many of the measurable consequences of the war, it cannot reveal the intangible costs which in the long run may be of far greater significance. The survey spells out the casualty figures-827,000 U.S., South Vietnamese, and allied military personnel, over a million civilian casualties in South Vietnam, and countless thousands in Laos and Cambodia, and it is estimated that a third of the population of South Vietnam have become refugees in the course of the past 7 years. But those figures merely hint at the vast destruction of the social fabric and economies of Indochina wrought as a consequence of this tragic war. There is no way of measuring the true cost of a shattered social structure, lost opportunities for development, persistent inflation, black marketeering, corruption, and prostitution. The survey recalls our attention to the 296,000 wounded Americans, but it cannot document the psychological effects of war on the two million who have returned physically intact. Nor can it quantify the effects of this experience on U.S. society-not only the direct economic costs realized through our own inflation, high interest rates and balance-of-payments deficits, but also the intangible costs in terms of erosion of respect for the law, further disruption of the constitutional system of checks and balances, increased distrust of Government, and the growing use of violence as a political tool. These indirect and intangible consequences of the war will have an enduring effect on our future. It is ironic that the war which started, ostensibly, as one to defend freedom and democracy in South Vietnam may have the effect instead of seriously undermining democracy in the United States. In retrospect it is tragically clear that the almost $200 billion estimated by this study to be the cost of the war accrued so far would have been better devoted to solving the problems of our own society, rather than in pursuit of a futile military adventure which has served only to exacerbate them.J. W. FULBRIGHT, Chairman.

World War II remains the defining experience for the U.S. Army in the twentieth century. It has had a lasting impact on the nation and its place in the world and on the Army and the way it organizes and fights. Although historians have written numerous volumes concerning this global conflict, some gap in the literature remain. In particular, the subject of an American field army headquarters and its organization and role have attracted little attention. Studies on the personalities and styles of individual commanders exist, but the command posts themselves-the ways in they were structures and operated and the functions they performed-have not been much explored. With A Command Post at War: First Army Headquarters in Europe, 1943-1945, the Center of Military History attempts to redress this shortcoming. This study addresses the First Army headquarters in the European theater from its activation in October 1943 to V-E Day in May 1945. Under Generals Omar N. Bradley and Courtney H. Hodges, the First Army headquarters oversaw the American landings on D-Day, the breakout from the Normandy beachhead, the battle of Hürtgen Forest along the German frontier, the defense of the northern shoulder during the Battle of the Bulge, and the crossing of the Rhine River at Remagen prior to the final American drive into central Germany. In examining the First Army headquarters' role, this volume shows the army headquarters of World War II as a complicated organization with functions ranging from the immediate supervision of tactical operations to long-range operational planning and the sustained support of frontline units. The commander and staff faced the problem of coordination with Allied counterparts as well as with headquarters and units from other services. Inadequate information and the limitations of technology added to their challenges. The human dimension was always important, and at times critical, in affecting the work of the headquarters under the stresses of a difficult campaign against an obstinate and resourceful foe. Although times have changed and the modern Army focuses more on regional conflicts and contingencies than on global warfare, we can still learn much from the experience of the First Army headquarters. The Gulf War reemphasized the role of an army headquarters in a theater of operations as a pertinent issue for today's military professional. By examining the experience of soldiers in past conflicts we gain the deeper perspectives and understandings necessary to meet the challenges facing the Army today and in the future.Washington, D.C. JOHN S. BROWN21 June 2000 Brigadier General, USA Chief of Military History