Books in the New Perspectives on Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology series

Describes and analyses early landing operations (from the Revolution to the Civil War) of American history, showing how they contributed to its rich amphibious tradition. This study does not attempt to describe every amphibious operation in early America, but focuses on seven major battles or campaigns providing a strong appreciation for the roots of American amphibious traditions.

While numerous studies have examined Woodrow Wilson's policy of neutrality prior to US entry into World War I, none has focused on the actual merchant ship losses that created the final casus belli. This work focuses on what the president knew and when he knew it concerning the loss of ten ships between February 3 and April 4, 1917.

Abraham Whipple (1733-1819) is little-known, yet intrepid and frequently successful Continental Navy officer who contributed significantly to the War for Independence. This biography of Whipple presents a look inside the life of this Continental officer. It illustrates at a personal level the complexities of naval warfare.

This study examines the transformation of the United States Navy as a fighting organization that took place on the North Atlantic Station between 1874 and 1897. At the beginning of this period, the warships assigned to this station were collectively administered by a rear-admiral, but were operationally deployed as individual units, each of whose actions were directed by their captains. By 1897 the North Atlantic, or Home Squadron as it was known, was a group of warships constituting a protean battle fleet that is, an organized body moving and fighting in close-order, which meant that the actions of the captains were directed by a commanding admiral. The process of the development of an American battle fleet resulted in the construction of a new organizational identity for the North Atlantic Squadron. This process was as critical as the eventual outcome. It was not linear, but one in which progress in critical areas was modulated by conflicting demands that caused distraction. From 1874-1888, exercises in fleet tactics under steam were carried out sporadically utilizing existing wooden cruising vessels. From 1889-1894, the last wooden cruisers were decommissioned and the Squadron consisted entirely of new steel warships. Ad-hoc concentrations of vessels for purposes besides exercise and training retarded the continued development of doctrine and tactics necessary for a multi-ship fighting capability during this time. However, much work was done to develop a concept of multi-ship operations. From 1895-1897, the identity of the North Atlantic Squadron as a combat unit solidified. Tactical exercises were held that had specific offensive and defensive wartime applications. These exercises were necessary to develop a combat capability. The results of this study demonstrate that the United States government had an interest in developing an offensive naval combat capability as early as the 1870s. Based on the record of the North Atlantic Squadron, it is argued that imperial aspirations, in the sense of possessing a capability to restrict the actions of other great powers in the Caribbean region, existed prior to the War of 1898. However, the process of change often resulted in the appearance of capability without the rigorous exercise necessary to possess it.

During World War I, the United States Navy conducted at the Portsmouth, NH Naval Prison what many penal scholars consider the most ambitious experiment in the history of progressive prison reform. Cell doors remained opened, prisoners governed themselves and thousands of rehabilitated prisoners were returned to the fleet. This humanitarian experiment at Portsmouth prison stood in stark contrast to the inhumane flogging of prisoners that had dominated naval discipline until 1850. The Navys journey between these two extremes in naval discipline included the development of a much needed naval prison system.When congress abolished flogging in 1850, the Navy was left with few punishment options. Flogging had been a harsh, but very effective and efficient discipline tool. Various conditions of confinement appeared to be the most logical substitute for flogging, but the Navy had few cells ashore and confinement onboard a nineteenth century man-of-war sailing vessel was impractical. Onboard space was limited and all hands were needed to sail and fight the ship. Subsequent naval directives that merely suggested punishments for various offenses led to inconsistent interpretation and application of punishments throughout the fleet. At the same time, courts-martial prisoners were sporadically confined in various marine barracks, navy yard jails, naval station guard houses, prison ships and state prisons. The Navys discipline system was in disarray. A naval prison system was needed to consolidate and provide for consistent treatment of prisoners. The Navys efforts to gain congressional approval for a prison in the 1870s were unsuccessful. In the late 1880s, the Navy took matters into its own hands and established a prison system centered on makeshift prisons at the Boston and Mare Island Navy Yards. An ever-increasing need for cells, primarily driven by high desertion rates, eventually resulted in the construction of the Navys first real prison at Portsmouth, which opened in 1908. A consolidation of naval prisons in 1914 left Portsmouth as the dominant centerpiece of the naval prison system.At this point Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt chose the most celebrated prison reformer of his era, Thomas Mott Osborne, to assume command of the Portsmouth prison. His reforms at Portsmouth went well until Vice Adm. William S. Sims and others became convinced that too many trouble makers were being returned to the fleet. Under mounting pressure from senior naval officers, FDR personally led an on-site investigation of conditions at Portsmouth prison, which included charges of gross mismanagement and rampant homosexual activity. Although exonerated by FDRs team, Osborne resigned from the Navy shortly after the investigation. Osbornes reform initiatives were quickly reversed as the Navy returned to a harsher punishment system more inclined toward deterrence than humanitarian considerations and prisoner comforts.

Today USS Pampanito is a tourist destination. During WWII the submarine earned six battle stars, sank six Japanese ships, damaged four others, and rescued seventy-three British and Australian POWs from the South China Sea. Astonishingly, this rescue happened three days after she sank one of the transport ships on which the Allied prisoners were being ferried to Japan.The chain of events that led to this rescue is truly remarkable. Captured in 1942, forced to spend fifteen months constructing the Burma-Thai Railroad, and then loaded onto floating concentration camps--hellships, as they were called--the prisoners were in the wrong place at the wrong time when Pampanito and her wolf pack attacked a Japanese convoy. Returning to the coordinates a few days later, the crew was astonished to discover survivors in the water from among the more than 2,200 prisoners who had been aboard the Japanese ships.Even more remarkable is that the officers and crew of Pampanito, after picking up these men (the Lucky 73), thought to have them record their thoughts and experiences while the events were still fresh in their minds, before returning to port. While working as curator for Pampanito, Aldona Sendzikas discovered these documents and began an odyssey of tracking down one of the most incredible rescue stories of the Pacific War.

Traces the evolution of the role of the US merchant ship flag, and the US merchant fleet itself. Rodney Carlisle looks at conduct and commerce at sea from the earliest days of the country, when battles at sea were fought over honour and the flag, to the current American-owned merchant fleet sailing under flags of convenience via foreign registries.

The geopolitical situation in the Mediterranean before the First World War generally has been ignored by historians. In the years leading up to the war, however, waning British control of the sea occupied the minds of leaders from Austria-Hungary, Italy, and France to the isles of Great Britain. This change was driven by three largely understudied events: the weakening ability of the British Mediterranean Fleet to provide more ships for the North Sea, Austria-Hungary's decision to build a navy capable of operating in the Mediterranean, and Italy's decision to seek naval security in the Triple Alliance after the Italo-Turkish War. These three factors radically altered the Mediterranean situation in the years leading up to the First World War, and they forced Britain and France to seek accommodation from each other. These power shifts also prompted the French to undergo a rapid naval build up, commissioning new warships to defend their own interests as well as those of the British. All of this activity has been largely obscured by the July Crisis of 1914 and the ensuing world war. Traditional history has looked backward through the lens of the war in order to explain the situation in the Mediterranean in 1914. Hendrickson, however, reverses course, chronicling the naval and diplomatic events that unfolded in the region prior to the outbreak of fighting in order to understand how policymakers perceived the changing Mediterranean world they desperately wanted to control.

Maritime events today appear to be tied more closely to events ashore than ever before and seafaring has been the primary catalyst of much of world history. These essays by many of the world's leading scholars present an up-to-date assessment of the field of maritime history in the early 21st century.