Defense of Free Will Skepticism and Its Ethical Implications

Free will skepticism denies that humans possess the type of freedom required for moral
responsibility (FMR). While not the most popular position in scientific, philosophical, or
mainstream communities, I contend that this lack of acceptance is due not to flaws inherent in
the position, but to misconceptions concerning its ethical and practical implications. In my
dissertation, I endorse free will skepticism, beginning with a refutation of contrary positions,
followed by a response to objections, and ending with a defense of social reforms necessitated by
the denial of free will. Ultimately, I support Derk Pereboom's optimism that a global acceptance
of free will skepticism would result in societies that are more moral, beneficial, and just than
those which perpetuate the illusion of free will.
Because of flaws in the alternative positions, I argue that free will skepticism is the most
feasible view to hold regarding free will. Libertarianism, which denies causal determinism and
purports that humans possess FMR, is not compatible with our current scientific understanding
of the universe. On the other hand, while compatibilism accepts causal determinism, it retains
free will only by relaxing the requirements for it. I explain why accepting a position contrary to
science, or accepting weakened definitions of freedom, is both untenable and unnecessary.