Freedom and Fatalism in Wittgenstein's Discourse on Freedom of the Will

This seeks to demonstrate the continuing relevance of Wittgenstein's approach to the problem of freedom of the will, primarily
as expounded in his "Lectures on Freedom of the Will" (LFW). My overall aim is to show how Wittgenstein works to reconfigure the debates
about freedom of the will so that it can be confronted as the kind of problem he thinks it ultimately is: an ethical and existential problem. Not
published until 1989, the LFW have received scant critical attention. I argue that Wittgenstein's approach is highly distinctive in a way that
makes it significantly less vulnerable than its closest cousins to certain powerful lines of critical attack. Chapter One brings out the
distinctiveness of the LFW, especially vis-à-vis a putatively Wittgensteinian form of compatibilism, exemplified by Kai Nielsen.
Albeit in different ways, Wittgenstein and Nielsen are both concerned to show why being caused to act, e.g. by the laws of nature, does not equate
to being compelled to act, e.g. against one's will. Unlike Nielsen, however, Wittgenstein further recognises that showing the compatibility
of freedom and natural laws establishes no more than the logical consistency of holding people responsible, given determinism, and so
cannot itself constitute a defence of our practices. Chapter Two introduces, as a still closer comparison with Wittgenstein, P. F. Strawson's
practice-based defence of interpersonal, 'reactive' attitudes (e.g. feelings of resentment, gratitude, etc.).